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Lessons on rural development, challenges and approaches
Lecciones del desarrollo rural, desafíos y enfoques
Absalón Machado1
ABSTRACT RESUMEN
For 25 years, Colombia implemented a rural development policy 
according to models adopted in Latin America since the 1960s. 
That policy advanced progressively toward decentralized and 
participatory development and it also moved forward to new 
concept of rural territorial development. Nevertheless, the 
Integrated Rural Development Program – IRD, turned into a 
Co-financing Fund, due to several reasons, ended during the 
second half of the 1990s. The change of protectionist policies 
towards deregulation, political cooptation of the program 
and the weak State capacities to replacing the IRD with other 
alternatives to stabilize rural societies contributed to the dis-
appearance of the policy. 
Colombia manejó una política de desarrollo rural durante 25 
años bajo los modelos impuestos en América Latina desde los 
años setenta. Esta política tuvo un avance progresivo hacia un 
desarrollo descentralizado y más participativo dirigiéndose 
hacia un concept de desarrollo territorial rural. Sin embargo, 
por múltiples las causas el Programa DRI, convertido en Fondo 
de Cofinanciamiento, se dio por terminado cuando empezaba 
el segundo quinquenio de los años noventa. El cambio de las 
políticas proteccionistas hacia una desregulación, la cooptación 
del programa por los políticos, así como la poca capacidad y 
decisión del Estado para sustituirlo con otras alternativas que 
estabilizaran las sociedades rurales, ayudaron a la desaparición 
de esta política. 
Key words: IRD, integral rural development, Co-financing, 
decentralization. 
Palabras clave: DRI, desarrollo integral campesino, cofinan-
ciación, descentralización.
Introduction
Colombia has stopped executing rural development 
programs with substantial state investment and with 
support from external resources. This has worsened the 
crisis of agricultural peasant economies, aggravated by 
the internal conflict translated into dispossession and 
abandonment of lands and forced displacement, among 
other aspects. Currently, the nation does not have a clear, 
coherent, systematic or planned policy of rural develop-
ment, and the State has dedicated its resources more to 
supporting entrepreneurs from the agricultural sector; 
thus, worsening the inequity. 
These notes do not refer to contemporary approaches on 
rural development; rather, we seek to synthesize the most 
important experiences on this theme, taking as a reference 
the Colombian case, which is similar to that of many Latin 
American countries, except for the existence of the internal 
conflict that has its greatest expressions in rural areas. This 
reflection makes sense for the new generations and the 
public technocrats to become aware of the experiences the 
country has undergone, and to recover positive aspects and 
avoid repeating errors in new programs.
The historical process of rural 
development, the IRD experience
During the last sixty years, we have gone through several 
experiences that somehow sought to transform the agri-
cultural structures and societies, and it must be stated, 
without much success. Starting with the so-called com-
munity development applied during the 1950s and 1960s 
that appealed to the potential forces of the most depressed 
communities, which with the aid of the techniques would 
identify individual and collective needs and would plan 
how to address their problems. Jordán and other authors 
indicated in 1989 that this was a psycho-social approach 
of development, which conceived the rural communities 
as homogeneous social units free of conflicts and internal 
divisions (Jordán et al., 1989). This vision stemmed from 
international entities and aimed to identify leaders who 
could serve as agents of change. In 1965, The United States 
stopped supporting this strategy. 
Then, as of the 1960s, came the agrarian reform, also as a 
strategy promoted by the United States to help governments 
contain revolutionary movements that would follow the 
Cuban example (Delgado, 1965). The agrarian structures 
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were considered an obstacle in developing the rest of sectors 
of the economy. These were types of development programs 
inasmuch as that to treatment of land ownership problems 
there were also actions in credit, technical assistance, train-
ing, and supply of some public goods.
It is well known in Latin America and in Colombia why 
the agrarian reforms failed, particularly because of resis-
tance to change by the landlord classes and the exercise of 
political power by the traditional rural elite, as well as the 
weakness of public entities to manage a complex process 
that implied transformations in production systems, in 
power relations, in rural ways of life, in the distribution 
of wealth, and in the social organization (Sampaio, 1993; 
Ramos, 2001). 
Many countries, among them Colombia, missed the op-
portunity of progressing in the transformation of their 
agrarian structures within a structure like the one from 
the 1960s, when there was international support and the 
internal conditions were given to generate processes of 
change. These reforms only managed to become sectorial 
conceptions and did not consider the necessary links of the 
urban and rural societies to have obtained political support 
from the urban communities for the rural transformations 
(Machado, 2009a).
The agrarian reforms were somehow a wager for a more bal-
anced rural society, with greater equity and democracy, and 
with a productive strut that would guarantee the perma-
nence of agricultural peasant economies next to business 
developments, with an adequate use of natural resources. 
Overcoming backwardness and poverty was behind this 
proposal, as well as the resolution of ancestral conflicts 
among peasants, landlords, and the state. 
Since the mid 1970s, arose the proposal of Comprehensive 
Rural Development, known as the IRD, which had several 
ramifications and lasted longer than the agrarian reform, 
inasmuch as it was decision aimed at productively mod-
ernizing the agricultural peasant economies to improve 
living conditions with important state support in services 
and infrastructure. 
The IRD program in Latin America stemmed from the pro-
posal by the president of the World Bank made in Nairobi 
in 1975. A foreign idea was imported, and because it had 
an offer of external resources it was quickly incorporated 
onto the development plans and extended to where the 
lending banks maintained an interest in supporting the 
governments with those initiatives. 
The IRDs were never a threat for the power factors in that 
they were unfolding over a rigid agrarian structure and 
without stating the land access problems. The elites, the 
landlord classes, and the politicians supported the IRDs and 
allowed them to progress what they could, given that these 
did not affect the established social order in the countryside.
These programs were generally conceived with a com-
prehensive concept that, however, did not reach a holistic 
approach as suggested by the theory for rural develop-
ment. There was much important progress in institutional 
development generated around these to support sectorial 
policies. These programs, in their most traditional version 
of rural development, were made viable within the context 
of a model of centralist and interventionist development 
by the state, and progressed in decentralization processes 
amid many political difficulties (López-Cordovez, 1991).
During their evolution, the IRDs began acquiring re-
gional and decentralization visions, which opened new 
perspectives in the relationships of the regions, locations, 
and communities with the state. However, changes in 
macro-economic policies, especially economic aperture 
and intensification of globalization, changed the emphasis 
in rural development as a priority in development. State 
deregulation and the concept that markets best regulate 
the relationships among agents and define access to the 
productive factors, trashed the IRDs, which perished at 
the hands of neoliberal ideology and production wagers of 
competitiveness and efficiency (Machado, 2003).
During the 1990s, in general, there was inf lection in 
diverse modalities of rural development (the PNR [Plan 
Nacional de Rehabilitación] and the IRD Fund in Colom-
bia, complemented by the subsidized land market). Few 
nations maintained consistent programs tending to small 
producers aimed at strengthening their capacities to gain 
access to resources and the market. In other instances, 
social solidarity funds were developed for the poor who 
arrived in the rural sector with higher or lower intensities. 
In other cases, attention has centered on food safety and 
the struggle against rural poverty as in the Brazilian case. 
The persistence of poverty in rural areas has led to, not 
to rural development programs, but rather to projects 
for the poorest, many of them still with an “assistance” 
sense; others with focus seeking to remove restrictions to 
emerge from the trap of poverty. A program that was a bit 
removed from such in Colombia was the PNR (PNR, 1994). 
Meanwhile, there is conceptual progress like that of rural 
territorial development that seeks a more regional view of 
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development and of urban and rural integration with the 
new rural concepts (Pérez and Sumpsi, 2001).
The Colombian experience of IRD
Colombia, like most Latin American nations, has had two 
major stages during its rural development. The first began 
in 1975 and went until 1992 when the IRD Fund became a 
Co-financing Fund, and it is characterized by centralism 
and protectionism where the IRD was the policy of rural 
development. Since 1992, a second stage was established 
where decentralization and participation set the standard 
within the postulates of the new Constitution of 1991, 
which sought to transfer leadership to communities and 
civil society rather than to public workers. 
During this stage, the IRD stops being the policy to become 
an instrument of a sectorial and national policy, operating 
as a piece within a national co-financing system. Policies 
were defined outside the IRD Fund and were guided by 
decentralization and co-financing; changing the form and 
content of rural development (Ministerio de Agricultura, 
1996). Furthermore, the IRD appears as a substitute for 
the agrarian reform that had been suspended in 1973 as 
an option of rural policy (Machado, 2009a).
From 1975 to 1992, two phases stand out: from 1975 to 1988 
and from 1988 to 1992 (Programa de Desarrollo Integral 
Campesino - PDIC). The first phase is aimed at agricultural 
peasantry landlords in the Andean zone, preferably tend-
ing to middle class or rich agricultural peasantry seeking 
to turn them into small entrepreneurs in food production. 
The IRD was a complementary program for the National 
Food and Nutrition Plan (Plan Nacional de Alimentación 
y Nutrición - PAN) until 1982 when the IRD and the PAN 
were united. In 1983, the IRD is transferred from National 
Planning to the Ministry of Agriculture and in 1985 it was 
institutionalized with the creation of the comprehensive 
rural development fund (legislation 47 of 1985), which is 
supported by Decree 77 of 1987 on decentralization that 
grants the IRD Fund the quality of a public establishment.
The beneficiary agricultural peasantry received individual-
ized attention (technical assistance and credit) and active 
community participation and by local authorities were not 
a special concern for the program in phase I (until 1985). 
The program focused on a group of municipalities from the 
Andean zone, which was broadened to other departments. 
The main instruments were the Project execution contracts 
with public institutions and NGOs, along with credit and 
technical assistance granted (Vargas del Valle, 1999). 
The second phase opened with the Peasantry Compre-
hensive Development Program (Programa de Desarrollo 
Integral Campesino - PDIC) de 1988-1992. Rural develop-
ment became a municipal responsibility and the IRD Fund 
gained importance in co-financing said responsibility 
(Decree 77 of 1987). In 1988, the CONPES (Consejo Na-
cional de Política Económica y Social) approved the PDIC 
and broadened coverage from 350 to 620 municipalities 
(according to the peasant economy index). Identifying 
development problems and prioritizing investments took 
place at the countryside (rural) and municipal levels (Mu-
nicipal IRD Committee) and from there, the projects were 
presented to the IRD Fund for co-financing according to 
a co-financing matrix. The PDIC was conceived as a long-
term program. The Fund complemented fiscal efforts by 
the municipality receiving sales tax transfers. Credit was 
centralized in FINAGRO (Fondo para el Financiamiento 
del Sector Agropecuario) and technical assistance was 
transferred to the municipalities through the UMATAS 
(Unidades Municipales de Apoyo Técnico Agropecuario), 
given that efforts concentrated on components of greater 
impact: technology, technical assistance, commercializa-
tion, roadways, rural aqueducts, organization and training, 
small-scale irrigation, among others.
Regional IRD offices were strengthened to channel the 
demand for projects from the communities and passed the 
filter by the municipal and departmental committees of 
the IRD Fund. Free concurrence of executing agencies was 
introduced to carry out services and construction works. 
The PDIC can be considered a transition phase between the 
traditional scheme of the centralized IRD and the national 
co-financing system that operates with decentralization. 
The IRD Fund concentrates its strategy on the productive 
development, commercialization, and access to markets 
and the supply of drinking water, agreeing with the scheme 
of economic aperture and the leading role of the markets, 
while tending to a more production-based vision of devel-
opment established as of 1990. The instrument continues 
being the co-financing matrix and operational guidelines 
and co-financing agreements with the municipalities (Var-
gas del Valle, 1999).
The PDIC operated amid two contradictory forces: the 
Constitution of 1991 and the imposition of neo-liberalism 
upon public policy. It unfolds within an uncertain context 
and without much clarity on the viability of the agricultural 
peasant economies and within a policy of modernization of 
the state guided by efficiency and free of bureaucracy criteria, 
or of engineering by institutions. INCORA (Instituto Co-
lombiano de la Reforma Agraria), IRD, and PNR still subsist 
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amid this contradiction; and it could be said that such grinds 
at these entities against their scant resistance in the transition 
phase and against the difficulty of institutional adjustment 
and the lack of political will to promote rural development. 
The National Co-financing System (decree 2132 of 1992) 
gave rise to the Co-financing Fund for Rural Develop-
ment. The new IRD version, as a support instrument for 
the territorial entities for rural development, maintains 
the idea that municipalities assume responsibility for that 
development, and the Department is incorporated as a new 
player with intermediation functions among the IRD Fund, 
the municipalities, and the communities. Due to this, the 
IRD regional offices were substituted by the Udecos 
(Unidades Departamentales de Cofinanciación). The re-
gional political element started to act and claim spaces. 
Negotiation instances like the Municipal Committees for 
Rural Development (Ley 101 de 1993) were created in the 
municipalities. When rural development was subjected to 
the demand by the municipalities and departments, com-
prehensiveness was gradually lost. The IRD Fund, within 
this co-financing scheme, no longer defined policies or 
promoted rural development; it was a policy instrument 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Planning 
Department. Investments focused on the poorest munici-
palities and those with a higher rural index.
As of 1994-95, public policy abandoned the idea of the agri-
cultural peasantry specializing in food production, letting 
their competitive capacity guide them toward products that 
can improve their income, and where the markets respond; 
activities outside the farm surged as alternatives for rural 
inhabitants (Reardon et al., 2001). 
The illusion of a 4th phase of the IRD 
and the announced setback 
The final act of the process came in 1996 with the prelimi-
nary suggestion for the 4th phase of the IRD Fund for the 
1997-2000 period based on an evaluation underway from 
the 3rd phase (1991-1996) and on a more holistic vision of 
development under the los paradigms of competitiveness, 
equity, and sustainability (Vargas, 1996); a revision of the 
rural concept, or of the rural society, and emphasis on 
development being led by the municipalities and locations 
with more autonomy and decentralization. The limitations 
imposed by the conflict in the countryside and the need to 
solve such in a peaceful and civilized manner were kept in 
mind, as well as having a vision of the type of society we 
sought to construct. Significant progress had been made 
in the conception of rural development.
Responsibilities and competencies were defined, thus:
a)  The municipality administrates and leads the process, 
that is, manages it.
b)  The Department coordinates and integrates regional 
development from municipal initiatives.
c)  The Nation formulates policies and norms, technical 
support, subsidy support, general guidance for the 
process, and inter-institutional articulation.
It was proposed that the nation transfer resources to territo-
rial entities (TE) only to complement their scarce resources 
in areas and themes of rural development important in the 
execution of the policies contained within the National 
Development Plan. This implied very precise regional fo-
calization (municipal and departmental indicative quotas). 
It was suggested that the nation could use mechanisms to 
transfer resources via two modalities: a) co-financing and 
b) through direct transfer; and the creation of the Depart-
mental Co-financing Funds was suggested. 
Emphasis centered on strengthening and institutional de-
velopment of municipalities and departments. The program 
would concentrate on three components or subprograms: 
institutional development (improve skills to manage de-
velopment), investments for rural development (improve 
amount and quality of assets), and support services (tech-
nical assistance, education, health, and organization and 
community training) (Vargas del Valle, 1999).
Due to political reasons and because of the context, this 
proposal only reached the initiation phase; it did not manage 
discussion or presentation with international organizations 
during President Samper’s mandate. Thereafter, we evidenced 
the definite setback of the rural development programs. The 
following governments devalued those programs and ended 
up suppressing the entities in charge of introducing a new 
paradigm: rural production development compatible with 
competitiveness and development of markets, complemented 
by the granting of subsidies to rural inhabitants, displaced 
or not, without tending to the development of their skills. 
That is, productive emphasis in the policies and paternalism 
and patronage with State resources.
The story is well known: since the late 1990s there was the 
dismantling and elimination of entities like the IRD Fund, 
IDEMA (Instituto de Mercadeo Agropecuario), and Caja 
Agraria and what remained was gather under one poorly 
designed and conceived entity like INCODER (Instituto 
Colombiano para el Desarrollo Rural), which was quickly 
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trapped by web of patronage, corruption and cooptation 
in some regions by political groups allied with illegal 
armed groups. 
To save that entity, the national government promoted a 
so-called statute for rural development (Ley 1152 de 2007), 
which was quickly declared unconstitutional by the Con-
stitutional Court because of procedural irregularities and 
because it did not recognize the rights of the Indigenous 
and Afro-descendant communities. With this legislation, 
instead of overcoming public partitioning, it was accentu-
ated upon distributing the functions of rural development 
into several entities that had no capacity or interest in as-
suming matters that were foreign to them. 
This led to an institutional void for rural development, 
which has not been overcome and reflects clear political 
intentionality: development is with the entrepreneurs not 
with the agricultural peasants considered socially handi-
capped and players without social and political recognition. 
The priority is set on tending to the consequences of the 
conflict and the rural crisis, which is the forced displace-
ment of the population, instead of tending to the causal ele-
ments of said phenomena (Machado, 2009b). The political 
context and the weakness of the rural social organization 
permitted such a setback when it was most urgent to have 
a policy of rural development to overcome the conflict and 
the rural social crisis. 
Reflections based on the Colombian experience
Colombia closed the book on rural development programs 
without creating an autonomous development process run 
by the communities. Likewise, it closed the possibilities of 
agrarian reform without having accomplished a minimum 
transformation in agrarian structures. That is why we 
have rural societies in crisis and amid serious difficulties 
to progress in processes of change required by the new 
contexts. Those two milestones and the armed conflict 
left the agricultural peasant societies trapped, in general, 
in underdevelopment.
In Colombia, with the end of the PDIC (Programa de De-
sarrollo Integral Campesino), as well as with the close of 
the PNR, which were economic and institutional proposals 
for long-term stabilization of rural societies, the nation 
missed a political opportunity to consolidate democracy 
in the countryside. That decision implied a high political 
cost at a time when experience had been gained to manage 
and organize rural development programs that could have 
significant impact in the countryside.
The three most significant rural development programs 
carried out by Colombia during the last 50 years ended up 
truncated, left behind. Some like the PDIC (IRD), when 
they were merely reaching their maturity, were abandoned 
without possibilities of recovery. Different circumstances 
led to that, but the most important were the changes in 
the rural development model, mounted from abroad and 
accepted without much thought by elite running the Co-
lombian State.
The political cost was even higher during the juncture of 
the intensification of the conflict in the sector when the de-
structuring of the rural society during the 1990s reached 
its climax. New social orders were established by illegal 
armed groups with game rules imposed by individuals and 
private groups, but not by the state; and where illegality and 
informality were imposed upon society. Furthermore, old 
orders that resisted change were sustained by the violent 
situation and even strengthened through political power. 
It is not difficult to consider those processes as a tragedy 
for the nation, and especially for the rural society.
The nation dismounted the institutionalism it had created 
for rural development in the mid 1990s during the worst 
juncture of the armed conflict, during the least opportune 
historical moment, it also dismantled the agrarian reform 
during the early 1970s when it had opportunities to change 
the agrarian structure in many regions of the nation, which 
would have reported substantial political dividends in the 
process of handling the conflict. 
The IRD program, in its PDIC version, was on the verge of 
taking a significant step during the 1990s when a proposal 
was made, which unfortunately was not accepted. It sought 
to co-finance municipal rural development programs in-
stead of projects and components. This proposal required 
strong development and institutional enhancement during 
a difficult context of the conflict.
It was closet o taking a qualitative leap when the concept 
of rural territorial development had still not taken flight. 
Placing rural development as a priority in the munici-
palities, reflected in the reorientation of investments and 
decisions of the communities was at that moment great 
progress. But the context was not suitable, municipalities, 
programs and investments were co-opted by illegal armed 
groups in much of the municipalities where agricultural 
peasant economies predominated. 
Colombia quickly lost the institutional memory of rural 
development. The experiences were not institutionalized 
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or systematized, and the new public workers and the 
new technocracy, generally do not recognize it, or have 
no interest in those experiences. The task is still pending 
to construct an institutional historical memory on rural 
development. Those experiences must be evaluated in light 
of new contexts, which raise questions on the efficiency 
of decentralization during a situation of conflict, or great 
local and regional institutional weakness, and where drug 
trade permeates all public spheres. The only evaluation of 
the IRD experience in Colombia is perhaps that conducted 
by Ricardo Vargas (Vargas, 1996).
The evaluations show the need to consider cultural and 
political variables. What is evaluated is the demand for a 
local political culture and the validity of the Legal Social 
State. Due to this, Vargas understandably states that “prior 
to physical bridges or roadways, what needs to be constructed 
and developed are bridges and roadways of transformation 
of the political culture”.
The IRD ends up being a menu of options, which the com-
munities must freely and transparently access. But an IRD 
requires gaining political will; it cannot be done outside the 
power circles, requiring negotiation with them, even of the 
power structures are not affected. Was that the failure of 
the IRDs? Most likely what was gained was the sympathy 
and conviction of some technocrats and personnel, but not 
from the political spheres. 
And this is what may have trashed the program when 
patronage entered full-handedly into the distribution of 
the resources for the regions according to political quotas. 
Politics appeared in the IRD and the PDIC through the 
back door to control resources based on electoral interests, 
which helped to terminate the program. In an appreciation 
on this theme, in 1996 we stated:
“The appearance of parliamentary subsidies disguised 
within the SNC (Sistema Nacional de Competitividad), 
through specific destinations to projects approved in Con-
gress and incorporated in the national budget, introduces 
a factor of uncertainty to the system, to the extent that it 
distorted the co-financing and interferes in the power of 
the municipalities and communities to define the projects 
in which they should invest their resources. The attitude of 
the governors to support projects in the CODECOs (Comités 
departamentales de Cofinanciación) without following 
technical criteria and assignment per the demands of the 
municipalities, acceding to political favoritism, increases 
doubts on the permanence of the co-financing system, such 
as it was designed” (Machado, 1996).
Another one of the interesting aspects mentioned by 
Vargas in his evaluation is that it was not generalized 
to find careful consensus work regarding the type of 
rural society that was to be constructed in the short and 
mid-term. Therein lies a relevant question: Is it possible 
to – in the short and mid-term – to tend to problems of 
poverty, inequity, low productivity, scarce social capital, 
institutional weakness, access to markets and factors, 
and creation of employment and income opportunities, 
without even thinking of the type of rural society we want 
to construct, or of the social order we want to set up in 
the long term? The answer cannot be absolutely affirma-
tive and depends much on the capacities of very society 
and its institutions to gain long-term awareness for the 
processes undertaken. 
The challenge of rural development in our societies remains 
as it did 60 years ago: How to achieve stable and balanced 
rural societies with social and political recognition of the 
rural inhabitants within a project of society based on the 
construction and development of democracy? Or, also: How 
to eliminate poverty, inequity, and exclusion and leverage 
our capacities for present and future challenges? 
We should have gone from theory to action long ago and 
from certain political ingenuity to reality for rural develop-
ment to become part of our wager for a better society. Rural 
development is not a technical and financial problem, but 
rather a political problem, a matter of the model of gen-
eral and agrarian development and of the political model 
adopted by our societies.
Literature cited
Delgado, O. 1965. Reformas agrarias en la América Latina. Procesos 
y perspectivas. Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico DF.
Jordán, F., C. Miranda, W. Reuben, and S. Sepúlveda. 1989. La 
economía campesina en la reactivación y el desarrollo agrope-
cuario. pp. 207-290. In: Jordán, F. (ed.). La economía campesina: 
crisis, reactivación y desarrollo. IICA, San José de Costa Rica.
López-Cordovez, L. 1991. Lineamientos conceptuales para el desa-
rrollo rural sostenible y equitativo. IICA; GTZ, Santiago.
Machado, A. 1996. El desarrollo rural y su contexto. Colombia 
1975 - 1995. Fondo DRI 1976-1996. pp. 340-366. In: Seminario 
20 años de Desarrollo Rural en Colombia y sus Perspectivas. 
Fondo DRI, Ministerio de Agricultura, Bogota.
Machado, A. 2003. La cuestión agraria frente al neoliberalismo. pp. 
269-282. In: Restrepo, D.I. (ed.). La falacia neoliberal. Crítica 
y alternativas. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota.
Machado, A. 2009a. Propuesta de elementos para una política de 
tierras en medio del conflicto. pp. 11-29. In: Desplazamiento 
forzado. ¿Hasta cuando un estado de cosas inconstitucional? 
Tome II. Codhes, Bogota. 
4432010 Machado: Lessons on rural development, challenges and approaches
Machado, A. 2009b. La reforma rural. Una deuda social y política. 
CID, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogota.
Ministerio de Agricultura. 1996. 20 años de Desarrollo Rural en 
Colombia y sus Perspectivas. Fondo DRI, Bogota.
Pérez, E. and J.M. Sumpsi. 2001. Políticas, instrumentos y experien-
cias de desarrollo rural en América Latina y Europa. Ministerio 
de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación, Madrid.
PNR, Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación. 1994. Memorias del PNR 
1982-1994. Bogota.
Ramos, B.M. 2001. Reforma agraria: un repaso a la historia. pp. 94-
153. In: Colombia tierra y paz: Experiencias y caminos para 
la reforma agraria alternativas para el siglo XXI 1961-2001. 
Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria – Incora, Bogota. 
Reardon, T., J. Berdegué, and G. Escobar. 2001. Rural nonfarm em-
ployment and incomes in Latin America: overview and policy 
implications. World Development 29(3), 395-409.
Sampaio, P. 1993. La crisis latinoamericana y el problema agrario. 
PNUD; FAO; Incora, Bogota.
Vargas, R. 1996. Lineamientos de una propuesta para la Fase IV del 
Fondo DRI 1997-2000. pp. 255-287. In: Seminario 20 años de 
Desarrollo Rural en Colombia y sus Perspectivas. Fondo DRI; 
Ministerio de Agricultura. Bogota.
Vargas del Valle, R. 1999. Seminario experiencias exitosas de 
combate a la pobreza en América Latina: lecciones para una 
reorientación de las políticas. FAO; Rimisp, Santiago.

